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ABSTRACT
The use of operating system API calls is a promising task in the detection of PE-type malware in the
Windows operating system. This task is officially defined as running malware in an isolated sandbox
environment, recording the API calls made with the Windows operating system and sequentially
analyzing these calls. Here, we have analyzed 7107 different malicious software belonging to various
families such as virus, backdoor, trojan in an isolated sandbox environment and transformed these
analysis results into a format where different classification algorithms and methods can be used. First,
we’ll explain how we got the malware, and then we’ll explain how we’ve got these software bundled
into families. Finally, we will describe how to perform malware classification tasks using different
computational methods for the researchers who will use the data set we have created.
Keywords Malware analysis; cyber security; dataset; sandbox environment; malware classification
1 Introduction
Nowadays, the use of computers in daily life is becoming widespread and as a result, computer attackers are attacking
computers using different methods, or they use these computers as weapons. Although computers become more secure
with each new operating system version or update, attackers can bypass these security components using different
methods. The most common scenario of security component bypass methods is that the malware changes its source
code and behavior on each infected computer [1]. All of the methods used by analysts to detect malicious software
is called malware analysis. Malware analysis is a very broad term and includes many stages. These stages include
examining the contents of the suspicious software without running the software and then running the software in an
isolated environment, examining the domain name system (DNS) resolution requests, recording the registry reads/writes,
file accesses and the application programming interface (API) calls.
These malware act for a specific purpose. We know that they are used for many different purposes such as preventing
a system from working, gaining unauthorized access to a system, obtaining personal data. For such purposes, many
different platforms such as servers, personal computers, mobile phones, and cameras are targeted. Today, the number of
platforms that have become a target is increasing. Consequently, malicious software developed for these platforms are
also quite different. In particular, in the first 4 months of 2018, 40,000,000 is considered to be the face of the danger of
new malware.
Nowadays, there is a considerable amount of time spent to protect from this software and significant budget expenditures.
In order to protect against malicious software, many products are produced both commercially and academically. There
is a serious struggle between attackers producing malware and the parties trying to identify these software. As a result
of this situation, it increases the competencies and capabilities of both sides. Metamorphic malware are the result of
this struggle.
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Metamorphic malware are the most advanced members of the malware family. These malicious software, using different
methods, can make their structures change continuously by making changes in their own source codes. In this way, they
change the code signatures. In addition, these software may have the ability to recognize the environment and store
their harmful actions by counter-analysis actions in the environments created for malware analysis [2]. Metamorphic
malware are difficult to detect and classify as they have such capabilities.
Considering the development of malware, it is observed that they underwent a structurally perfect evolution. But there
is one constant characteristics in each phase. These features are designed to benefit in an undesirable way. That is, they
have a harmful behavior. All malware should perform some actions to achieve their goals. Assuming that a malware is
on a computer running the Windows operating system, this malware needs to use some of the services offered by the
operating system. The entire set of requests to get these services (Windows API calls) creates a malicious behavior.
Malicious software detection and classification can be performed if such malicious behavior is well analyzed.
Detection of malicious software includes many design issues that need to be addressed, such as incorrect jump op codes
in the assembly codes, hidden content in the .text block in portable executable (PE) file, and encrypted content. In this
study, we have collected the current malware and their variants such as WannaCry and Zeus, especially on the Github
website, we obtained the family classes from VirusTotal site by finding the hash values of each malware and finally,
all the behaviors were recorded by running them in a Cuckoo sandbox environment. Our argument is that almost all
malware change their behavior using a variety of methods, although they change their behavior, malicious software
have a target and have a pattern of paths to achieve this goal. Furthermore, a malware makes unnecessary API calls
during the behavior change, it can be detected by a model to be trained by analysts because the pattern is the same.
Malware analysis may be defined as the branch of cyber security which consists of two phases: (1) static analysis, (2)
dynamic analysis of suspicious files. The static analysis can broadly be defined as examining the executable file without
viewing the actual instructions by executing in an isolated environment. The well-known example of static analysis
are MD5 checksums, recognition by antivirus detection tools, finding strings. Dynamic analysis refers to actual run
malware to understand its functionality, observe its behavior, identify technical indicators. A most important part of the
behavioral records is API call sequences. Most studies in the field of dynamic malware analysis have only focused on
the classification algorithms. The key problem with those research are that there is no benchmark datasets to check the
efficiency of the proposed models [3].
This study seeks to obtain data which will help to address these research gaps. The specific objective of this study is
to build a benchmark dataset for Windows operating system API calls of various malware. This is the first study to
undertake metamorphic malware to build sequential API calls. It is hoped that this research will contribute to a deeper
understanding of how metamorphic malware change their behavior (i.e. API calls) by adding meaningless opcodes with
their own dissembler/assembler parts.
We shared our data set over github site 1. We believe that this dataset can be used by researchers who conduct studies
on behavior-based malware analysis.
2 Methods
The dataset contains raw data regarding the cuckoo sandbox based known malware execution and VirusTotal based
classification of files using their MD5 signatures.
2.1 Windows API Calls
The Windows API is an interface for developing applications on the Windows operating system. Application developers
can communicate with your operating system using the Windows APIs. Therefore, the operating system offers many
services as an API. A Windows application needs to use the APIs to use a function provided by the operating system.
The use of these functions is defined as the API call. An application makes API calls many times during its execution.
For example, when an application is requested to create a file, it must call the CreateFileA API [4]. API calls made by
an application on the system can show the behavior of this application. For this reason, API calls are often used in
dynamic malware analysis. The basic entries of the data set used in this study are API calls made by malware on the
operating system.
1https://github.com/ocatak/malware_api_class
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2.2 Cuckoo Sandbox
You can check any suspicious file in a few minutes with Cuckoo. It provides a detailed report showing the behavior
of the file is executed in an isolated and realistic environment. Nowadays, it is not enough to detect and remove the
effects of malware: it is vital to understand the context, motivations and how they work to understand the purposes of a
violation. Cuckoo Sandbox is a free software that automates the task of analyzing malicious files under Windows, OS
X, Linux and Android. Cuckoo Sandbox is an advanced, highly modular and open source automated malware analysis
system with endless application possibilities.
In computer security, the sandboxing is a security mechanism used to separate running programs. Usually sandboxing
is used for unconfirmed applications from third parties, suppliers, untrusted users, and untrusted websites. The Cuckoo
Sandbox system has two basic components. The first component is the management machine where the analysis of
malware is started, the results are written to the database and the web service is provided for the users. The second
component is the analysis machines to run malicious software. Analysis machines can be virtual or physical machines
[5].
2.3 VirusTotal
Virus Total is a free service that allows you to analyze files or URL addresses online. Many antivirus application
engines and website scanners are used for analysis. Files considered to be harmful are analyzed individually in antivirus
application engines. Each antivirus application engine creates an analysis report for the suspicious file [6].
The same analysis case is valid for URLs to be analyzed. The VirusTotal service includes a very large set of analyzes.
In this way, a new scan can be performed, as well as previous analysis information can be obtained. Virus Total offers a
service interface (VirusTotal Public API v2.0) to provide results without using a browser, as well as through a web
browser. With this interface, files / URL addresses can be analyzed automatically.
Virus Total Public API provides the results of the analysis as a JSON object. The results of each antivirus application
engine and web browser analysis are obtained separately.
2.4 Dataset Creation
The data set as presented herein has a very simple structure. Our dataset is provided as comma-seperated values (csv)
files to enhance the interoperability, and no specific software or library is required to read them. The data were collected
with git command line utility from various github pages. Each row in this data set is an ordered sequence of Windows
operating system API calls that belong to an analysis in the cuckoo sandbox environment.
The following steps were followed when creating the dataset.
1. Preparation of Cuckoo Sandbox Environment: The Ubuntu operating system was installed on the analysis
machine. Then the Cuckoo Sandbox application has been installed. The analysis machine is run as a virtual
server, where malware will be run and analyzed. Windows operating system is installed on this server. The
firewall has been turned off and operating system updates have not been applied to prevent any obstacles
during the operation of malicious software.
2. Analysis of malware: More than 20,000 malware were run in Cuckoo Sandbox one at a time. The application
has written the analysis information of each malware into the MongoDB database. From this analysis
information, the behavior data of the malware on the analysis machine were obtained. These data are all
Windows API call requests made by the malware on the Windows 7 operating system.
3. Processing of Windows API calls: We have observed 342 kinds of API calls in our dataset. These API calls
are indexed with numbers 0-341 to create a new dataset. We have used the results of the analysis of the
malware that had at least 10 different API calls in this data set.
4. Analysis of malware using Virus Total Public API : In addition to our own analyzes, all malicious software
contained in the data set were also analyzed by requesting the Virus Total service. In this way, each malware is
analyzed by many different antivirus engines and their results are recorded.
5. Processing of analysis results: The Virus Total service uses approximately 66 different antivirus applica-
tions for file analysis. Using the results of each analysis we obtained with this service, we identified the
families of each malware. As a result of our observations, we found that different antivirus applications
for the same malicious software give different results. In addition, it was observed that not every antivirus
application can detect some malicious software. For example; When the malware file with the hash value of
06e76cf96c7c7a3a138324516af9fce8 is analyzed in the Virus Total service, many applications indicate that
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this file is a worm, while some applications such as DrWeb show that it is a trojan, and Babable application
indicates that this executable is a clean file. Therefore, while detecting class of each malware; it is accepted
that it belongs to the majority class of all analysis.
Figure 1 shows the general flow of the generation of the malware data set. As shown in the figure, we have obtained the
MD5 hash values of the malware we collect from Github. We searched these hash values using the VirusTotal API,
and we have obtained the families of these malicious software from the reports of 67 different antivirus software in
VirusTotal. We have observed that the malicious software families found in the reports of these 67 different antivirus
software in VirusTotal are different.
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Figure 1: Overall representation of our data sources and technologies.
In our research, we have translated the families produced by each of the software into 8 main malware families: Trojan,
Backdoor, Downloader, Worms, Spyware Adware, Dropper, Virus. Table 1 shows the number of malware belonging to
malware families in our data set. As you can see in the table, the number of samples of other malware families except
AdWare is quite close to each other. There is such a difference because we don’t find too much of malware from the
adware malware family.
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Table 1: Distribution of malicious software according to their families.
Malware Family Samples Description
Spyware 832 enables a user to obtain covert information about another’s computer activities by
transmitting data covertly from their hard drive.
Downloader 1001 share the primary functionality of downloading content.
Trojan 1001 misleads users of its true intent.
Worms 1001 spreads copies of itself from computer to computer.
Adware 379 hides on your device and serves you advertisements.
Dropper 891 surreptitiously carries viruses, back doors and other malicious software so they can
be executed on the compromised machine.
Virus 1001 designed to spread from host to host and has the ability to replicate itself.
Backdoor 1001 a technique in which a system security mechanism is bypassed undetectably to
access a computer or its data.
Total 7107
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Figure 2: The first 20 APIs used in our analysis.
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Figure 3: The last 20 APIs used in our analysis.
The operating system APIs used by malware families vary depending on their structure. These differences can be API
or API calls. Malicious software can also make unnecessary API calls to hide themselves and have a different signature
on each client. The main reason for creating different signatures is that anti-viruses detect malicious software according
to their signatures.
Figure 4 shows the normalized values of Windows operating system API calls that belong to each family of malware.
Figure 5 shows the most correlated 30 API calls heatmap for each malware type. As can be seen from the figure, some
APIs are called together for each family of malware. The malware follow the pre-defined API call sequence when
performing their malicious activities. Although the order of these API calls is different for different malware, it may be
quite similar in terms of malware families. For this reason, the figure shows 5-10 APIs, which are highly correlated
especially for Dropper and Worms malware families.
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Figure 4
5
A Benchmark API Call Dataset for Windows PE Malware Classification A PREPRINT
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(a) Downloader
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(b) Worms
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(c) Spyware
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(e) Dropper
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(f) Virus
Figure 5: Windows API correlation heatmap.
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Table 2: The most correlated API calls .
Adware Backdoor Downloader Dropper
API Pairs Corr API Pairs Corr API Pairs Corr API Pairs Corr
getfileversioninfosizew
findresourcew
1.0 regclosekey
process32nextw
1.0 ntopendirectoryobject
ntduplicateobject
1.0 iwbemservices_execmethod
writeprocessmemory
1.0
regcreatekeyexa
openservicew
1.0 ntduplicateobject
ldrgetprocedureaddress
1.0 openscmanagerw
loadstringa
1.0 gettemppathw
regdeletekeya
1.0
findresourceexw
regdeletevaluea
1.0 internetopena
findresourceexw
1.0 getcursorpos
setfilepointerex
1.0 ntcreatethreadex
setfiletime
1.0
ntcreatethreadex
ntsetinformationfile
1.0 closesocket
ldrgetprocedureaddress
1.0 createremotethread
internetopenw
1.0 ntprotectvirtualmemory
setwindowshookexa
1.0
regdeletevaluea
getasynckeystate
1.0 getadaptersinfo
regqueryvalueexa
1.0 ntcreatekey
regenumvaluew
1.0 ntreadfile
readprocessmemory
1.0
ntcreatekey
regopenkeyexa
1.0 ntcreatethreadex
ntopenmutant
1.0 deviceiocontrol
gettemppathw
1.0 iwbemservices_execmethod
ntcreatesection
1.0
getsystemmetrics
ntcreatethreadex
1.0 ntopenfile
unhookwindowshookex
0.99 closesocket
ntduplicateobject
1.0 ntcreatesection
writeprocessmemory
1.0
createdirectoryw
ntopendirectoryobject
1.0 ntclose
getbestinterfaceex
0.99 ntopendirectoryobject
closesocket
1.0 getvolumepathnamesforvol...
findfirstfileexw
1.0
findresourceexw
getasynckeystate
1.0 ntallocatevirtualmemory
getusernameexw
0.99 ntopenmutant
setwindowshookexa
1.0 ntopendirectoryobject
regqueryvalueexw
1.0
getsysteminfo
regenumvaluew
1.0 getsystemwindowsdir...
ntenumeratevaluekey
0.99 findresourcew
findwindoww
0.99 coinitializesecurity
cryptacquirecontextw
0.99
closesocket
ntduplicateobject
1.0 unhookwindowshookex
gethostbyname
0.99 getfileattributesw
findresourcew
0.99 findresourcea
loadstringa
0.99
Spyware Trojan Virus Worms
API Pairs Corr API Pairs Corr API Pairs Corr API Pairs Corr
readprocessmemory
ntreadfile
1.00 ntclose
createdirectoryw
1.00 closesocket
ntduplicateobject
1.00 internetopena
findresourceexw
1.0
regqueryvalueexa
openservicew
1.00 bind
wsasocketw
1.00 enumservicesstatusa
iwbemservices_execmethod
1.00 getsystemdirectorya
coinitializesecurity
1.00
createtoolhelp32snapshot
ntgetcontextthread
1.00 getbestinterfaceex
regdeletevaluea
1.00 iwbemservices_execmet.
ntcreatesection
1.00 startservicea
getsystemdirectorya
1.00
ntcreatesection
getusernameexw
1.00 ntcreatesection
setsockopt
1.00 getbestinterfaceex
regdeletevaluea
1.00 ntsetvaluekey
getsystemdirectorya
1.00
createtoolhelp32snapshot
setendoffile
1.00 ntduplicateobject
ntcreatethreadex
1.00 getusernamea
getnativesysteminfo
1.00 ntcreatethreadex
setfiletime
1.00
ntopendirectoryobject
closesocket
1.00 searchpathw
createdirectoryw
0.99 internetopena
regdeletevaluea
1.00 startservicea
ntsetvaluekey
1.00
setendoffile
ntgetcontextthread
1.00 writeprocessmemory
createremotethread
0.99 enumservicesstatusa
ntcreatesection
1.00 closesocket
regqueryvalueexw
1.00
ntunmapviewofsection
ntgetcontextthread
1.00 regdeletevaluea
getusernameexw
0.99 setfiletime
createservicea
1.00 getsystemdirectorya
cryptacquirecontextw
1.00
createtoolhelp32snapshot
ntunmapviewofsection
1.00 getbestinterfaceex
getusernameexw
0.99 getadaptersinfo
createjobobjectw
1.00 setfiletime
bind
1.0
copyfilea
regqueryinfokeyw
0.99 httpsendrequestw
regqueryinfokeya
0.99 getadaptersinfo
createjobobjectw
1.00 ntcreatethreadex
bind
1.00
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